by Linda Miller Atkinson, Trial Magazine
How can jurors evaluate the claim of a severely brain-injured plaintiff who can’t testify in the conventional way? Make sure they observe the plaintiff in court and hear testimony from ‘interpreters’ who can tell his or her story.
If you’ve ever represented a catastrophically injured client—for example, a brain-injured person who can no longer speak or even think the way he or she did before suffering a serious head injury—you’ve heard defense counsel ask speculative questions that your client cannot answer. For example:
“Tell us about your cognitive function before the car crash. What did you know then that you don’t remember now?”
“Are you doing well in school, or are you developmentally delayed?”
“What would you have seen if you had looked behind you before the crash?”
Although the answers to these questions go to the heart of the case, the plaintiff is in no position to respond. Brain-injured plaintiffs cannot tell the jury through ordinary testimonial means what happened, how their lives have changed, what they can and can’t do, or what they need in order to live useful lives. Yet jurors need this evidence to judge the facts.
Under these circumstances, how can you present the evidence necessary to support the case and persuade jurors to compensate your client? The answer lies in a two-pronged strategy: Ensure that your client attends the trial, even if only for short intervals, and use “interpreters”—experts, teachers, therapists, family members, friends, and coworkers—to supply the testimony that your client cannot give.
Not all evidence is verbal. Jurors observe the plaintiff whenever he or she is present in the courtroom—conferring with you, interacting with family members or caregivers, listening to testimony, entering and leaving the court, and so on. They will use this visual evidence as they consider important questions: How does the plaintiff communicate? Do the plaintiff’s interactions with others in the courtroom support witnesses’ testimony about his or her actions and capabilities outside of court? Do the plaintiff’s injuries appear consistent with evidence about causation? To answer these questions, jurors need to observe your client firsthand.
You must analyze and present nonverbal evidence as carefully as you analyze and present documentary and verbal evidence. Just as you plan for a court reporter to take and show a video deposition, you must plan for a nurse attendant, parent, or spouse to assist your client in court. Just as you plan to show excerpts from a “day in the life” film, you must plan for your client to appear in the courtroom at appropriate times, even if only briefly.
Right to attend
Some courts—often citing the need to protect against what they believe is jurors’ irrational vulnerability to sympathy—have excluded severely injured plaintiffs from the courtroom even during the presentation of their cases.
For example, in Caputo v. Joseph J. Sarcona Trucking Co., the trial judge barred the plaintiff (who had been declared incompetent before trial) during the liability phase, holding that his presence in the courtroom would impair the jury’s ability to be objective.1
Some courts have found that a brain-injured plaintiff cannot assist counsel at trial, as though assistance were only verbal or cognitive. For example, inProvince v. Center for Women’s Health & Family Birth, the trial court granted the defendant’s request to exclude the plaintiff, a brain-injured infant, during the liability phase of the trial.
The California appeals court agreed that the infant could not assist counsel, holding that the Due Process Clause does not grant a civil litigant an absolute right to be present in court in person. Overlooking the value of the jury’s observations of the infant plaintiff, the court said counsel alone may sufficiently protect the client’s interests in the courtroom.2
Fortunately, some courts—particularly the Sixth Circuit—have provided helpful language supporting the plaintiff’s right to attend. In Lane v. Tennessee, the court noted criminal defendants’ right to be present throughout trial and concluded, “Parties in civil litigation have an analogous due process right to be present in the courtroom and to meaningfully participate in the process unless their exclusion furthers important governmental interests.”3 It held that this guarantee is “protective of equal justice and fair treatment before the courts.”4
In an earlier case, Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, the Sixth Circuit determined that the trial court had improperly excluded a child plaintiff who had suffered neurological injury. The appeals court held:
A party to a lawsuit has a right to attend the trial absent an overwhelming reason to the contrary. In a civil case, this court can at this time envision no reason to exclude a party because of his injuries, particularly where, as in this case, the party’s behavior at trial was not disruptive.5
Similarly, in Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp., the court held that the plaintiff’s severe injuries from an auto accident—rendering him incompetent, spastic, and paraplegic—were not grounds for excluding him from trial, especially because his behavior was not disruptive. The court found that his presence was not prejudicial to the defendant, noting that “the testimony of plaintiff’s damages witnesses . . . painted a grimmer picture of the injuries than the actual sight of [him].”6
The Helminski court explained that even if a judge determines that an injured plaintiff’s presence would prejudice the jury in his or her favor, the plaintiff may still have a right to attend the trial: “If the trial court concludes that the party can comprehend the proceedings and assist counsel in any meaningful way, the party cannot be involuntarily excluded regardless of prejudicial impact; in such a case, cautionary instructions will protect the interests of the defendant in a fair trial.”7
The real problem created by a severely injured plaintiff’s attendance in court is not related to sympathy—in fact, it is quite the opposite. Most jurors react with distaste to the brain-damaged or grossly disfigured plaintiff. They may involuntarily turn away in disgust or embarrassment, or they may believe that your client’s situation is so hopeless that no verdict can possibly help.
You must counter these natural, human reactions by showing jurors that your client can adapt and live productively. Jurors must observe the plaintiff to learn how he or she functions in daily life and interacts with family and care providers, and to determine that he or she is trustworthy.
In addition to citing supportive case law, you can improve your chances of avoiding exclusion by proposing that the plaintiff attend only certain parts of the trial. You might recommend that he or she be present during jury selection; opening statement; testimony of the life-care planner, teacher, or other rehabilitation witness; and closing argument.
Seek permission from the court—preferably in the jury’s presence—for your client to be absent during potentially embarrassing testimony, such as that regarding poor neurological or psychological prognosis, reduced cognitive function, permanent disability, or disfigurement. This way, the jury knows that the plaintiff is excused for this part of the trial and understands the reason for his or her absence.
Experts and evidence
In addition to the nonverbal evidence that your client’s presence in court provides, you’ll need to offer testimony from caregivers, teachers, rehabilitation specialists, speech pathologists, or life-care planners who can explain your client’s abilities and describe the tools that can give him or her a measure of independence. These witnesses provide an excellent vehicle for introducing the plaintiff to the jury. Demonstrations of your client’s ability to communicate, learn, and perform basic skills can be an effective part of this testimony.8
For example, in a medical negligence case involving a plaintiff who was a bank teller before she suffered unattended cardiac arrest resulting in brain injury, a life-care planner testified about the plaintiff’s limited memory and cognitive losses. The expert also described how, despite physical and mental limitations, the plaintiff could be more independent and increase her participation in family and church life if certain tools were available to her.
This witness, a specialist in mainstreaming brain-injured patients, explained that she developed the plaintiff’s life-care plan based on home visits, interviews, and examinations. She demonstrated the basis for her assessments by inviting the plaintiff to come forward; introducing her to the jury; and then questioning her about handling money, asking her to make change, and posing a few sample cognitive queries.
The witness then explained the significance of the plaintiff’s responses. The entire demonstration took only 12 minutes, and it offered compelling evidence that could not have been conveyed as effectively any other way.
Defendants sometimes object to this kind of testimony, claiming that it uses the plaintiff as “demonstrative evidence.” Most sophisticated courts have rejected this view. For example, in Talcott v. Holl, a Florida appeals court held that the brain-injured plaintiff was entitled to be present in the courtroom, even if she was there only to illustrate the expert’s testimony about her condition.9 It noted that a doctor may ask a plaintiff questions to show his or her inability to speak normally and may instruct the plaintiff to attempt certain motions to demonstrate his or her limitations. The court held that the scope and admissibility of such demonstrations is within the trial judge’s discretion.
Recently, the First Circuit, in Rubert-Torres v. Hospital San Pablo, Inc., found that the plaintiff’s physical appearance had evidentiary value in itself and provided a foundation for the testimony of three opposing experts.10 The trial judge had barred 21-year-old Kimayra Rubert-Torres, who was severely brain-injured at birth, from the courtroom. During trial, experts for both sides testified that they based their causation opinions largely on some of her physical characteristics. Her lawyer asked that she be allowed in the courtroom so her expert could demonstrate the physical factors significant to his opinion. The trial judge denied the request.
After a lengthy analysis of the evidence, the First Circuit reversed:
Clearly, the evidence was highly relevant. As has been explained, experts for both Rubert-Torres and [the defendant] relied upon Kimayra’s physical appearance to make expert conclusions. They disagreed as to what they saw, and the resultant conclusions differed. While those experts were allowed to describe Kimayra’s appearance for the jury, the “clearest evidence” [of] her physical appearance would have been for the jury to see her, which is usually favored over mere description.11
The court noted that even if the defense could show that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative—a showing it called “a difficult matter indeed”—the trial court could have found a less restrictive way to limit the potential for prejudice.
The First Circuit concluded, “Because the Federal Rules of Evidence favor the admissibility of evidence, less intrusive measures to minimizing the prejudicial effect of evidence are preferred to excluding evidence.”12
A different kind of interpreter
Trial lawyers have long appreciated that in death cases the decedent must “speak” to the jury without testifying—through photographs, films, and survivors’ testimony. Courts recognize that non-English-speakers must communicate through foreign-language interpreters. A case involving a catastrophically brain-injured plaintiff is analogous, and arguably the same concepts apply.
A compelling example comes from a Michigan divorce case, Bednarski v. Bednarski, in which both parties were deaf.13 The trial court appointed only one sign-language interpreter to cover all aspects of the proceedings. After the court awarded custody of the couple’s two children to their paternal grandparents, the wife appealed, arguing that she was denied the opportunity to participate fully in the custody hearing.
The court cited the state’s Deaf Persons’ Interpreters Act, which defines three functions for interpreters in legal proceedings: “to interpret the proceedings to the deaf person, to interpret the deaf person’s testimony or statements, and to assist in preparation of the action with the deaf person’s counsel.”14 The court found that the single interpreter had not adequately performed all three functions:
Since the sole interpreter was occupied with interpreting testimony of the various witnesses, defendant, when not on the stand herself, was unable to ask questions or otherwise communicate with others, including her counsel, during the course of trial. Moreover, the record is completely devoid of any evidence that an interpreter was involved with defendant and her counsel in the preparation of the action.15
To remedy the “unfairness” of the proceeding, the court ordered a new trial to determine custody.16
The Bednarski decision supports the argument that, like deaf litigants, neurologically impaired clients are entitled to meaningful participation in their cases. Use it to persuade the court to admit evidence from experts and other witnesses who can “interpret” for your client, providing the proof jurors need to form a more complete picture of the plaintiff’s life and ultimately find in his or her favor.
Remember that you are the plaintiff’s first interpreter: You recognize the limitations, losses, and changes in your client’s life and “translate” them into evidence of negligence, causation, liability, and damages. Then, you work with others to effectively communicate these proofs to the jury.
For example, a plaintiff’s coworkers can describe his or her job responsibilities and competence levels before the injury, compared with skill levels or limitations since. The plaintiff’s therapist knows how far from normal your client’s anatomical function is and can explain the extent of his or her efforts toward rehabilitation. These witnesses testify not to elicit sympathy, but to provide solid evidence.
Without a right to present proof effectively, the right to a jury trial is an empty promise. Jurors need both verbal and nonverbal evidence—witness testimony and their own observations—to render a just verdict. A brain-injured plaintiff must not be relegated to the courthouse corridors. His or her presence in the courtroom reminds us that justice extends not only to the fit and strong, but to all.
Notes
1. 611 N.Y.S.2d 655, 656 (App. Div. 1994).
2. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667, 675 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Bremner ex rel. Bremner v. Charles, 821 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Or. 1991) (en banc), modified, 832 P.2d 454 (Or. 1992) (en banc).
3. 315 F.3d 680, 682 (6th Cir. 2003).
4. Id.
5. 766 F.2d 208, 216 (6th Cir. 1985).
6. 562 F. Supp. 759, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d, 727 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1984).
7. 766 F.2d 208, 218 (emphasis added).
8. See Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Permissibility of In-Court Demonstration to Show Effect of Injury in Action for Bodily Injury, 82 A.L.R. 4th 980 (1990); L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Propriety of Permitting Plaintiff in Personal Injury Action to Exhibit His Person to Jury, 66 A.L.R. 2d 1334 (1959).
9. 224 So. 2d 420, 421-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 232 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1969).
10. 205 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2000).
11. Id. at 479.
12. Id.
13. 366 N.W.2d 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam).
14. MICH. COMP. LAWS §393.503.3(1) (2004).
15. Bednarski, 366 N.W.2d 69, 71 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 74.
As published in Trial Magazine, January 2005 Volume 41, Issue 1.
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